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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Problems  regarding  the  change  of  auditor  and  the  opinion  issued  by the  auditor  through  the  ﬁnancial
audit  report  have  been  shown  to  be  an  important  issue.
The  objective  of  this  study  is to  examine  to what  extent  the  change  of auditor  is related  to the type  of
opinion  that  the  auditor  expressed  in  the audit  report.
In  pursuit  of this  objective,  an  empirical  study  was carried  out supported  by  a sample  from  a  set  of
entities  with  securities  admitted  to trading  on the  Portuguese  stock  market  in  the period  between  2006
and  2012  (seven  years)  and  using  logistic  regression  to test  whether  the  reception  of the  qualiﬁed  audit
report  indicated  the  change  of auditor.
The ﬁndings  point  to  there  being a signiﬁcant  positive  relationship  between  the  qualiﬁed  audit  report
and  a change  of auditor,  veriﬁable  for qualiﬁed  opinions  on  assets  and  others,  but  not  to the  qualiﬁed
opinions  on  equity  and liabilities.
The  largest  number  of  qualiﬁed  opinions  occur  in  the  years  2007,  2009  and  2011,  most  of  which  were
related  to equity  and  assets,  and  the change  of auditor  is  more  associated  with  qualiﬁed  opinions  on
assets  and  other  qualiﬁed  opinions  than  the qualiﬁed  opinions  on equity  and liabilities.
©  2015  ASEPUC.  Published  by Elsevier  Espan˜a,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
El  cambio  de  auditor:  El  caso  portugués
ódigos JEL:
42
alabras clave:
uditoría
a opinión del auditor
ambiar el auditor y el informe de auditoría
egresión logística
takeholders
r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Los problemas  existentes  relativos  al cambio  de  auditor  y  a  la opinión  emitida  por  el  auditor  a  través  del
informe  de  la  auditoría  ﬁnanciera  está  probado  que  se  trata  de  un  tema  de gran  interés.
El  objetivo  de  esta investigación  es  examinar  hasta  que  punto  el  cambio  de  auditor  está  relacionado
con  el tipo de  opinión  que el auditor  expresa  en  el  informe  de  la  auditoría.
En la  consecución  de  este  objetivo  se llevó  a cabo  un estudio  empírico  apoyado  en  una muestra,  un  con-
junto  de entidades  con  valores  admitidos  a negociación  en  el  mercado  de  valores  portugués,  en  el  período
comprendido  entre  2006  y  2012  (siete  an˜os)  mediante  regresión  logística  utilizada  para  comprobar  si la
recepción  del  informe  de  auditoría  ﬁnanciera  lleva al  cambio  de  auditor.
Los resultados  apuntan  a la existencia  de  una  relación  positiva  signiﬁcativa  entre  el informe  de  auditoría
y el cambio  de  auditor,  veriﬁcable  por  las  reservas  de  activos  y otros,  pero  no  a las  reservas  de  los  fondos
propios  y prestados.
El  mayor  número  de  reservas  se produce  en  los  an˜os  2007,  2009  y  2011,  la  mayor  parte  de  las  reservas
naturales  se  relaciona  con  la equidad  y activos,  y el  cambio  de  auditor  está  más  asociado  con  las  reservas
de activos  y otras  reservas  que  con  las  reservas  de  los  fondos  propios  y ajenos.
© 2015  ASEPUC.  Publi
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IntroductionThe audit report issues the auditor’s opinion on the ﬁnancial
demonstrations of the enterprise, such that it becomes of huge
ticle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-
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mportance, both for the users of the ﬁnancial information and for
he administration of the enterprise.
However, the users of the ﬁnancial information often misun-
erstand that the auditor’s opinion is too technical and concise and
he administration of the enterprises may  be tempted to relate the
uditor’s continuity with his/her opinion.
The research undertaken studies the relationship between the
ind of opinion issued by the auditor in his/her annual report and
he change of auditor, in terms of his/her continuity, from a sample
f entities with values admitted to trade in the Portuguese stock
arket, in the period between 2006 and 2012, and used logistic
egression to test whether the reception of the audit report from
our types of qualiﬁed opinions indicated the change of auditor.
The article is structured in four parts: the ﬁrst one discloses
he audit’s theoretical context in terms of the report and the audi-
or’s opinion and the second one reviews the factors that explain
he change of the auditor, the third develops the empirical study
n terms of sampling and variables, and the fourth and last part
iscusses the results.
In the current economical and social context of our society this
rticle aims to enhance the scientiﬁc contribute on the issue of the
hange of auditor, which has given rise to so much controversy from
he researchers and authors in the science community.
This research advantageously enhances the nature and the
otential impact of the information provided by the auditor to any-
ne interested in the entities and allows stakeholders to question
he administration on the information reliability and the current
uditor’s trust.
udit’s theoretical framework
he audit report
The audit report is the document where the auditor issues
is/her opinion on the ﬁnancial demonstrations of the enterprise
udited, such that this opinion is regarded by society as having a
ublic character. The audit report is often regarded as a “barometer”
or the enterprise’s ﬁnancial situation and not only as a document
hat reveals reliability on the ﬁnancial demonstrations (Arens and
oebbecke, 1996), such that the audit report is the climax of the
udit process through which the auditor issues his/her opinion on
he audited ﬁnancial demonstrations or the reasons not to issue
hem.
Under that line of thought, Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, and
ubramanyam (1998) state that the audit reduces the existing
nformation differences among the managers and the remaining
eople interested on the enterprise, since the users of such infor-
ation gain access to reliable ﬁnancial demonstrations through the
ertiﬁcation conveyed by the auditor.
Thus, the message issued by the auditor must be perfectly
nderstood and its function clearly deﬁned, that is, “the issuer task is
o ﬁght for a simple, clear, interesting and interactive message, in such
 way that it conveys at least the main points to the public target”
Kotler, 1996).
To Pasiouras, Gaganis, and Zopounidis (2007) the audit report
onsists of a report where the auditor issues an opinion regarding
he ﬁnancial demonstrations of the audited enterprise, enhancing
hether they are free from relevant distortions and whether they
ere developed according to the speciﬁc current legislation and
ollow the accounting norms and principles.
Also to Hope and Langli (2010), the audit report is an instru-
ent of communication, wherein the related parts are informed
n the conclusions provided by the auditor, as well as on the
ossible problems found in the internal controls and/or theish Accounting Review 19 (2) (2016) 181–186
ﬁnancial demonstrations of the enterprises audited, including
those regarding the enterprise ability to continue.
The justiﬁed theories of the audit in the present society must be
framed in the ﬁnancial information area since the audit report and
its publishing are a reliability element added to that information.
Finding an adequate theory to explain its existence is, in the
opinion of Almeida and Silva (2013) an academic and intellectual
challenge, wherein the agency’s theory is the one which is more
inclusive and unifying of the various justifying theories.
The agency’s theory comes from the separation between prop-
erty and entities management, which has given rise to differences
in the information and agency conﬂicts among owners and man-
agers, thus strengthening the auditor’s role for its reliability and
credibility provided to the society since it forms an instrument of
screening and reduction of the agency’s conﬂict.
This way, by being part of the social control process (Lee, 1996)
or of the responsibility of providing the accounts Flint, 1988) the
audit is justiﬁed on the basis of the agency’s theory, which is
regarded to a certain extent as a cover for the risk of information
(Porter, Simon, & Hatherly, 2008).
In the same line, Almeida and Silva stated that “the auditor may
be seen as a referee who deﬁnes the consistency of the ﬁnancial demon-
strations developed by the agent, taking as a pattern the rules of
accounting (. . .)  and as such the auditor is regarded as an agent who
veriﬁes the actions of another in a context of minimization of the main
cost” (p. 48).
Nonetheless, it is also important to refer that the auditory is
related to the theory of signalling (disclosure and transparency
regarding the market signals the entity and may reduce the ﬁnanc-
ing costs), to the decision taking theory (as it allows for the
assessment of the information value to potentiate better decisions,
according to Saada, 2000), to the theory of the government of soci-
eties (according to Power (1997) as it is an inclusive part of the
architecture of control imposed by internal or external motives),
the theory of insurance (according to Cosserat and Rodda (2009) the
insolvency is sought to be associated with an audit’s ﬂaw, supported
by the assumption that the release of fraud ﬁnancial information is
also the auditor’s responsibility).
The relevance and understanding of the audit report
Authors such as Siqueira (2004), Boynton, Johnson, and Kell
(2002), Wiesner (1987), Ricchiute (2002) and Cabal Garcia (2001)
and national and international organizations such as the Ameri-
can Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA), the Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England & Wales (ICAEW), the Compag-
nie Nationale des Commissaires aux Comptes (CNCC), the Ordem dos
Revisores Oﬁciais de Contas (OROC), the Instituto de Contabilidad y
Auditoría de Cuentas (ICAC), the International Federation of Accoun-
tants (IFAC) and the European Federation of Accountants have been
concerned about the clariﬁcation of the audit report’s main causes
for not being fully understood. The main reasons for the report’s
lack of understanding are as follows:
• Standardized report: as the structure of the report is according
to the norms, regardless of the activity sector it is applied to,
it becomes more a symbolic document than a communication
between the auditor and the user, which leads to the users not
reading the audit reports.
• Technical language: the commission for the auditor’s respon-
sibilities (Cohen Commission) enhances the use of a highly
standardized language which results in an ambiguity for most
of the users who  often lack the accountant or audit skills.
The users are not familiar with the terminology used in the
reports and that is why they ﬁnd it difﬁcult to understand the
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essage transmitted. If the aim of the audit report is to give
redibility to the ﬁnancial demonstrations issued by an enterprise
t becomes crucial that its users understand it.
Thus, García and Martínez (2001) have realized that on the one
and the excessive use of technical terms in the audit report and
n the other hand the report’s content being too concise make it
ifﬁcult to understand. Gay and Schelluch (2006), in their research
n this issue, enhance the uncertainty in the understanding of the
udit report from most of the stakeholders.
The responsibility of the audit report is not clariﬁed. Ruíz
Barbadillo (1998) believes that despite the research carried out in
the previous decades, the audit report still does not allow its users
to understand its nature and the asset that is the information
conveyed in it.
That idea is shared by López Combarros (1996) when he defends
hat “regarding these areas it is necessary to communicate to the users
f the ﬁnancial demonstrations the exact range of the work we hope
o perform and the level of responsibility we take on.”
In a research performed by Schelluch and Gay (2006), the con-
lusions were that the auditors believe to have higher levels of
esponsibility and accountability than that which is actually con-
erred to them by the users of the ﬁnancial information. The
hareholders skeptical attitude probably comes from the recent
nancial scandals in the enterprises.
xplaining factors of the change of auditor
The auditor is responsible for alerting the administration about
he weaknesses, uncertainties or irregularities found, which are
ften materially relevant and must therefore be mentioned in the
uditor’s report, and which give rise to a qualiﬁed auditor’s report,
nd as such the qualiﬁed auditor’s report may  have particular con-
equences: the enterprise’s administration may  “press” the auditor
o issue an unqualiﬁed audit report, as the value of the shares as well
s the administration fees may  be affected (Chow & Rice, 1982).
The administration will try to eliminate the possibility of the
uditor of issuing qualiﬁed auditor’s reports as those reports may
ave a negative impact on the perception of the stakeholders over
he administration in general and the enterprise in particular.
The enterprise scandal that involved Enron and the associated
udit enterprise, Arthur Andersen, has started the discussion on
he auditor’s independency through the process of auditing, since
he hiring period of the auditor is of about 10 years. Thus, when the
arbanes-Oxley Act was  being implemented there was  a suggestion
f implementing the requirement of change of auditor in the USA,
hich never really happened (Defond & Francis, 2005).
However, the change of auditor has been implemented in India,
ustralia, Singapore, South Chorea, Hong Kong, among others. In
ortugal, the CMVM has implemented the change of auditors for
he enterprises with open capital.
The literature about the qualiﬁed audit reports and the change
f auditor is linked. The most advocated variables to justify the
uditor’s opinion in the report include, amongst others:
Audit’s enterprise fees (Addams & Davis, 1994; McKeown,
Mutchler, & Hopwood, 1991);
Financial issues (Carpenter & Strawser, 1971; Haskins and
Willams, 1990);
Change of Administration (Burton & Roberts, 1967; Carpenter &
Strawser, 1971);
Enterprise size (Chow & Rice, 1982; Shank & Murdock, 1978;
Warren, 1980).ish Accounting Review 19 (2) (2016) 181–186 183
For the last few decades several empirical researches have been
carried out both in Europe and in the United States of America,
highlighting a set of variables related to the change of auditor,
namely ﬁnancial issues, entity size and administration or change
of ﬁnancial manager.
From the set of researches performed, the Smith’s (1986) per-
formed in the USA show that only 4% of the change of auditor comes
from the issuing of a qualiﬁed opinion.
Worth referring to is another research performed in the USA by
Davidson, Jiraporn and DaDalt (2004) on the potential reasons for
the change of the auditor, which are based on situations in which
the managers look for an audit of an inferior rank with costs for the
agency, that is, signalling the existence of issues on the quality of
the ﬁnancial auditory.
Also, in Europe, namely in the United Kingdom, a research
has been performed by Hudaib and Cooke (2005), wherein it was
realized that the entities with more ﬁnancial issues and where
there is the change of the ﬁnancial manager are more inclined
to get a qualiﬁed opinion from the auditor and that the like-
lihood of the change of auditor rises with the gravity of the
opinion.
The worldwide literature has performed various researches
related to the reasons that cause the enterprises to change the
auditor as stated above and which are centred on two approaches.
One is the market approach in which the change of auditor
is analyzed according to the nature of the audit demand that
the enterprises carry out and the supply performed by the audit
professionals. The change of auditor is related to the changes in
the economic-ﬁnancial and corporative features of the enterprises
(Firth, 1999; Francis & Wilson, 1988; Johnson & Lys, 1990; Palmrose,
1986).
The other approach is contractual, which focuses on the per-
ception of the audit as a contract in which the enterprise freely
appoints the auditor and where the possibility of a disagreement
between the auditor and the enterprise may  lead to a decision from
the enterprise to change the auditor (Francis & Krishnan, 1999;
Lennox, 2000).
Summing up, we  can conclude that there is a difference concern-
ing the impact of the audit report and the change of the auditor. If,
on the one hand some authors point out the change as a result of
the clients search for auditors who  issue a clear opinion, on the
other hand, organizations such as SEC (2000) and authors such as
Petty and Cuganesan (1996) defend the need to impose measures
of mandatory rotation of the auditors, arguing that long contracts
reduce the auditors motivation to keep an independent relation-
ship with the clients.
Empirical research
Population and sampling
The population target consists of the entities issuing security
values admitted to trade in a continuous market in the Portuguese
stock market, and the sampling is based on the above mentioned
entities that have provided their ﬁnancial demonstrations on the
internet site of the “Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários”
(CMVM) during the month of July 2013, corresponding to the period
between 2006 and 2012 (for seven years).
Hence it came that the population consisted of 120 entities, of
which 37 were cut (as they did not present any kind of economic-
ﬁnancial information, both on the internet site of the CMVM and
their own internet site) and 26 (for being ﬁnancial entities, there-
fore their ﬁnancial demonstrations disclosed a speciﬁc framework
not comparable to the other entities), wherein the sample consists
of 57 entities, which represent about 69% of the total entities.
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Table 1
Description of the variables: Dependent and independent.
 (Yn) Change of Auditor Dicotomic dependent variable that takes on the value 1 if the
enterprise changes the auditor in the year N and the value 0 does not
change
This way  the variable considered in the model reﬂects the type of
opinion issued by the auditor in a particular exercise
Dependent variable
QualifEq Qualiﬁed opinion on their Equity from
N-1 to N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if the enterprise has at
least one Reservation as their Own Capital and the value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 1
QualifLib Qualiﬁed opinion on their Liabilities
from N-1 to N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if the enterprise has at
least other Reservations as Borrowed and the value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 2
QualifAs Qualiﬁed opinion on their Assets from
N-1 to N-3
Dicotomic variable that takes on the value 1 if the enterprise has at
least one Reservation as Assets and the value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 3
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the highest number of qualiﬁed opinions concerns equity and
other qualiﬁed opinions and that the lowest number concerns
the qualiﬁed opinions on liabilities, as can be seen in Table 2.
60
50
40
30
20
10
0OtherQualif Other Qualiﬁed opinion from N-1 to
N-3
Dicotomic var
least one Rese
ource: The authors.
These 57 entities were analyzed in a consistent manner through-
ut the research period even if at some times they were not
ncluded in the list of issuing entities, according to the CMVM
nd, altogether a set of 337 observations were achieved during the
esearch period of time.
escription of the research and variables
In order to analyze to what extent the change of auditors can be
xplained by the auditor’s report itself, we have graded the auditor’s
eports in a period of seven years, that is, without qualiﬁed opinions
nd ranked, as this leads to a more consistent picture as well as a
ore objective reality (Cho and Trent, 2006).
Thus, Patton (2002) has adopted an identical procedure of expla-
ation, as it contributes to the validity and reliability, building a
ore faithful picture of the phenomenon through convergence.
We have adopted the statistical technique of logistic regression,
ust as McFadden (1973), Ismail, Ali Ahmed, Md  Nassir, and Abdul
amid (2008) and Heliodoro and Paula (2014) have defended and
sed to analyze the relationship between the dependent variable 
Yn) – change of auditor (which takes on the value of 1. When there
s a change of auditor and the value 0 (zero) in the opposite situ-
tion) – and four independent variables, estimated by the method
f maximum similitude, which are:
Qualiﬁed opinion on equity;
Qualiﬁed opinion on liabilities;
Qualiﬁed opinion on the asset;
Other qualiﬁed opinions not mentioned in the ones described
above.
Table 1 enhances the variables which were the object of
esearch, that is, the dependent variable as well as the four inde-
endent variables.
The selection of independent variables allows for the realization
f to what extent the entities in the sampling have changed their
uditors, for having received a qualiﬁed opinion, which is consid-
red as relevant and the object of international acknowledgement
y the scientiﬁc community, by Ball, Walker, and Whittre (1979),
allesta and García-Meca (2005), Brío González (1998), Gómez-
guillar and Ruiz Barbadillo (2000, 2003) and Senteney, Chen, and
shok (2006).
Logistic regression is a statistical technique that aims at pro-
ucing, from a set of observations, a model that allows for the
rediction of values on the basis of one or more variables ranked as
ndependent variables and considered binary.The research was based on the reports and accounts and on the
udit of the different entities that were the object of the research
n order to identify the typology of the auditor and his/her stay in
he entity through time, as well as the number and type of qualiﬁedhat takes on the value 1 if the enterprise has at
n as Other Reservations and the value 0 otherwise
Independent variable 4
opinions, wherein the Statistical Package for the Science Social (SPSS),
version 21, was used for the needed statistical analysis.
Results analysis
The assessment of the results achieved consists of a descriptive
analysis of the constant qualiﬁed opinion of the audit report and
the logistic regression.
Regarding the type of qualiﬁed opinions the following points
have been found:
• In terms of time the rise in the number of qualiﬁed opinions
between 2006 and 2007 – 305 qualiﬁed opinions were reported
in this period, which represent an average of 43.57 qualiﬁed opin-
ions every year, wherein the number of qualiﬁed opinions shifted
between a minimum of 33 (in 2012) and a maximum of 51 (in
2007), as can be seen in Fig. 1. It should be highlighted that there is
a higher number of qualiﬁed opinions in years of legislative elec-
tions (2009 and 2011) and that, at the same time, there is a lower
number of qualiﬁed opinions in the year before the legislative
elections (2008 and 2010), except for the year 2012.
• In terms of the type of qualiﬁed opinions it is clear that the higher
number of qualiﬁed opinions concerns equity (106, about 35%),
followed by the qualiﬁed opinions on the asset (70, approxi-
mately 23%), the other qualiﬁed opinions (68, which represent
22%) and, ﬁnally, the qualiﬁed opinions concerning the liabilities
(61, about 20%).
• If we  consider the type of qualiﬁed opinions it becomes clear thatSum of
2006
Sum of
2007
Sum of
2008
Sum of
2009
Sum of
2010
Sum of
2011
Sum of
2012
Fig. 1. Rise in the number of Qualiﬁed Opinion between 2006 and 2012.
Source: The authors.
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Table  2
Entities with a higher number of qualiﬁed opinion, by type.
Total of qualiﬁcations Qualiﬁcation on equity Qualiﬁcation on liabilities Qualiﬁcation on asset Other qualiﬁcation
Compta 7 7 0 0 0
CP  16 7 1 6 2
EDIA  14 2 1 6 5
Estoril Sol 17 1 6 1 3
FCP  18 7 3 1 7
Real  Estate Grão-Pará 13 1 4 2 6
Lisgráﬁca 20 5 2 6 7
Parque Expo 98 25 6 7 7 5
REFER 26 7 7 6 6
SCP  14 7 2 2 3
SLB  17 7 5 1 4
STCP 18 7 1 4 6
Source: The authors.
Table 3
Independent variables.
B SE Wald df Sig. Exp. (B) 95% CI to Exp (B)
Less than Superior to
1◦ Step QualifEq .301 .412 .534 1 .465 1.351 .603 3.028
QualifLib −.182 .422 .185 1 .667 .834 .365 1.907
1 
1 
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iQualifAs 1.062 .409 6.727 
OtherQualif −.752 .426 3.113 
ource: The authors.
We  have found that the highest number of qualiﬁed opinions (7)
efers to equity (covering eight entities), followed by qualiﬁed opin-
ons on asset and other qualiﬁed opinions (four entities each) and,
astly, the qualiﬁed opinions on liabilities (seven) in two of the types
dentiﬁed, which is the case of Refer (qualiﬁed opinions on equity
nd liabilities), FCP (qualiﬁed opinions on equity and other qualiﬁed
pinions) and Parque Expo 98 (qualiﬁed opinions on liabilities).
Concerning the result of logistic regression, a level of signiﬁ-
ance has been deﬁned (˛) of 0.1 as it is an acceptable probability
ewbold, 1997) and when the coefﬁcient of the variables present a
-value lower than the level of signiﬁcance deﬁned (p-value > ˛),
hen there is an inﬂuence of this independent variable, hence
able 3.
Bearing in mind the results of the Wald test, shown in Table 3,
e have concluded that the independent variables disclose two
ifferent behaviours:
Inductor to the change of the auditor from the independent vari-
able 3 – Qualiﬁed opinions on the Asset from N-1 to N-3 (QualifAs)
and the independent variable 4 – Other qualiﬁed opinions from
N-1 to N-3 (OtherQualif) – for disclosing a p-value lower than the
level of signiﬁcance deﬁned (  ˛ = 0.1), thus affecting the depen-
dent variable – the change of auditor – that is, the existence
of these two types of qualiﬁed opinions in the audit report is
an important factor to allow for a change of the auditor by the
enterprise audited.
Non-inductor to the change of the auditor from the independent
variable 1 – Qualiﬁed opinions on Equity from N-1 to N-3 (Qual-
ifEq) – and the independent variable 2 – Qualiﬁed opinion on
Liabilities from N-1 to N-3 (QualifLib) – for disclosing a p-value
higher than the level of signiﬁcance deﬁned (  ˛ = 0.1), not affecting
the dependent variable – the change of the auditor – that is, the
existence of these two types of qualiﬁed opinions is not a decisive
factor to replace the auditor.onclusion
Different authors defend that there are many factors that
nﬂuence the change of the auditor, wherein there are different.009 2.891 1.296 6.450
.078 .471 .204 1.087
approaches that try to explain them, namely the contractual
approach and the traditional one.
The audit reports of the entities that issue securities admitted to
trade in a continuous market in the Portuguese stock market and
that consist of our sample in the period between 2006 and 2012
enhance 305 qualiﬁed opinions that:
• Refer to an annual average of 43.57 qualiﬁed opinions.
• Most of the qualiﬁed opinions (58%) are relative both to equity
(with 35%) and to asset (with 23%).
Referring mostly to entities with public capital (with about 55%),
followed at a great distance the sportive anonymous societies (with
27%) and the entities with private capital (with the remaining 18%).
The change of the auditor (dependent variable) is inﬂuenced by
the situation of several types of qualiﬁed opinions (independent
variables) as the following has been found:
• The non-existence of qualiﬁed opinions has led to the keeping of
the auditor in about 66% of the cases.
• The ﬁnding of one to seven qualiﬁed opinions led to, on the one
hand, a change of the auditor (in about 50% of the cases) and,
on the other hand, to two changes of the auditor (in 33% of the
situations).
• The qualiﬁed opinions on the asset and others are decisive to
the change of the auditor, according to the result of the logistic
regression carried out.
• The qualiﬁed opinions on equity and liabilities do not contribute
to the change of the auditor, as a consequence of the logistic
regression carried out.
The change of the auditor may  be a consequence of an inten-
tional behaviour carried out by the entity in order to avoid the
adverse image before the users of the accounting ﬁnancial infor-
mation of the ﬁnancial audit report, that is, the entities that can
change the auditor do it in an intentional way so as to prevent a
negative image from the stockholders.
The existence of qualiﬁed opinions on the asset and others in the
audit reports are the most relevant and the ones that contribute to
1  Span
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G86 P.A. Heliodoro et al. / Revista de Contabilidad –
he change of the auditor as the entities seek to save the “value of
he active”, which adds up to the stakeholders satisfaction.
The conclusions of the research are limited to the number of
ntities in the sample and to the period of time analyzed. If the
eriod of time were longer and the sample size were larger, then
he results could eventually be more consistent.
In spite of the above mentioned limitations the research under-
aken has contributed for a better understanding of the existing
elationship between the type of opinion issued by the auditor
hrough the audit report and the change of the auditor.
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